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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL McCARTHY, 
Plaintiff a;nd App,ella;nt, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, "THIS IS 
TIIE PLACE" MONUMENT C01f-
~fiSSION, JOHN D. GILES, Execu-
tive Secretary and Treasurer of the 
said Commission, and .the following 
members thereof: ORVAL W. 
ADAMS, MARRINER W. BROWN-
ING, GEORGE S. ECCLES., JOHN 
F. FIT'ZGERALD, J. L. FIRMAGE, 
EARL J. GLADE, D·UANE G. 
IIUNT, ARTHUR W. MOULTON, 
GEORGE ALBERT S.MITH, and 
TAYLOR WOOLL·EY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF' OF AP1PELLANT 
STATEME·NT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8037 
This matter comes before the Court on appeal, after 
judgment of the Court following motions of the defend-
ants to dismiss, without any trial of the issues and with-
out any presentation of evidence before the Court. 
The apparent basis for the judgment of the Court 
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( R. 19'2), and as shown by the findings ( R. 188-191), is 
that the defendant is an agency of the State of Utah, 
the State of Utah has not given its consent to be sued, 
and that the United States District Court had hereto: 
fore determined that the Commission was such a state 
agency, and such determination in res judicata and bind-
ing upon the District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah 
The record is comprised prhnarily of the Complaint, 
Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, an 
Affidavit filed by the plaintiff, Daniel McCarthy (R. 
113-116), and an Affidavit of Irwin Clawson (R.120-187). 
The Complaint set forth two separate causes of 
action for $42,145.60, the first being brought against the 
defendant Commission as an Agency of the State of 
Utah, based upon unpaid balance due on a written con-
tract for the construction of a monument which is situ-
ated at the mouth of Emigration Canyon in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and which was dedicated in 1947 
upon the anniversary of the arrival of the Mormon Pio-
neers in this Valley. The Second Cause of Action is 
upon the same basis of obligation for labor and materials 
but alleges that the defendant Commission is a voluntary 
association, organized and associated together f~r the 
purpose of providing funds for the erecting of a monu-
ment in Salt Lake City, Utah, known as "This is The 
Place" Monument. 
The State of Utah has never consented to be sued 
in this action upon the contract, and hence, upon Motion 
for Dismissal made by the State of Utah (R. 29), the 
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Court ruade an order dismissing said First Cause of 
Action upon the basis that no consent to the litigation 
had been given by the State as required by statute . 
.. A .. s to the Second Cause of Action, a different set 
of facts n1us t be considered, and in light of the fact that 
the matter was dismissed "\vithout testimony, the Court 
must accept and give full credit to the facts alleged in 
the plaintiff's Cornplaint, Second Cause of Action, and 
the Affidavit of the plaintiff shown in the Record (113-
116). To summarize these matters, it appears that the 
defendants voluntarily associated together to erect the 
~1onument and to accomplish said purpose entered into 
a written contract as "Owner" on December 27, 1945 
with the plaintiff as "Contractor," wherein the plaintiff 
agreed to furnish and erect all of the granite work on 
the ~1onument and the surrounding area in accordance 
vvith drawings and specifications which were attached 
to and made a part of the contract. The voluntary asso-
ciation utilized at times the name "This is The Place 
Monument Commission" and at other times the name 
"This is The Place Monument Committee." 
As shown by the Affidavit of Daniel McCarthy and 
never controverted at any stage by any denials of record, 
the following facts are undisputed: 
That following the appropriation of $125,000.00 to 
the "This is The Place Monument Committee" by the 
1945 Legislature, donated funds totalling in excess of 
$200,000.00 from private sources were deposited iby the 
committee and comingled with the $125,000.00, and all of 
said funds \vere expended by the committee without any 
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supervision by the Finance Commission of the State of 
Utah; 
'I~hat all payments made to the plaintiff as well as 
to other con tractors and suppliers of materials in con-
junction with the creating and e.rection of the monu1nent 
following the appropriation in 1945, were made by checks 
drawn upon its private bank account as established by 
the comrnittee without use of any warrants issued by 
the Finance Co1nmission or by the Treasurer of the 
State of Utah; 
That the contract documents between Daniel Mc-
Carthy and "This Is The Place Monument Commission" 
for the granite work do not bear at any place thereon 
a designation that the "owner" is an agency or branch 
of the State of Utah, or that the contract is in the name 
of or on behalf of the State of Utah; nor do they show 
that they have been submitted to or approved by the 
Attorney General of Utah or any other constitutional 
officer of the State; 
That Daniel McCarthy as "contractor" had only a 
contract for the preparation and erection of the "granite 
work" on the monument and certain other items repre-
senting in total less than 40% of the gross expenditures 
made by the committee, and the said Daniel McCarthy 
was not a "general contractor" for the complete project; 
That the committee made other separate contracts 
and agreements for the bronze work, architectural and 
professional services, cement work, transportation and 
similar i terns in which the plain tiff did not participate, 
which said other contracts totaled in excess of $200,000.00 
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and that none of said contracts were sub1nitted to tht 
Utah State Building Board or Com1nission with respect 
to bids, contracts or construction of ~"This Is The Place" 
monument; 
That the said '"This Is The Place" monument was 
erected by the comn1ittee on land not owned by the State 
of Utah and that said land was a part of the Ft. Douglas 
~Iilitary Reservation, and the only authorization for 
use of that property is incorporated in a communication 
by George H. Dern, S.ecretary of War of the United 
States Government, dated February 15, 1935 to "The 
Honorable George Albert Smith, President, Utah Pio-
neer Trials and Landmarks Association, 50 No. Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah"; 
That no oaths of office were executed and filed by 
any member of the committee with the Secretary of State 
of Utah; 
That the affairs of the committee were handled from 
offices situated at 50 No. Main Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, not owned or under any written lease to the State 
of Utah, which offices were and are owned by the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints; 
That in a general ap-propriation bill, shown on Page 
166, Session Laws of Utah 1943, Item 43, the State of 
Utah appropriated $15,000.00 to this committee for its 
work. In 1945 the state legislature, in the general ap-pro-
priation bill, Page 292, Session Laws of Utah 19·45, Item 
135, appropriated the final sum of $125,000.00 to this 
com1nittee for the construction of the monwnent, which 
ite1n carried this language, "This amount to be made 
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available only when an additional $125,000.00 is deposited 
by the committee." That the payments under this con-
tract were made in the following fashion: The Archi-
tect, Taylor Woolley, certified amounts due to the com-
Inittee. The committee thereupon made vouchers to 
conform to· the certificate of the architect and drew a· 
check for the amount, payable to Daniel McCarthy. 
~ehese checks were against its funds on deposit in a local 
bank as above set forth. That the duties of the State 
Building Commission are set up under Title 10, Utah 
Code .Annotated, 1943. There is no record of any kind 
in the office of the State Building Commission with 
respect to any bids, contracts or construction of the 
"This is The Place" monument; 
That the committee employed various persons in 
conjunction with the erection of the monument, including 
inspectors for the supervision of the work thereon and 
none of said persons were employed in pursuance of the 
procedure established by the Finance Commission of 
Utah; 
That s·everal members of the committee sold materi-
als used in conjunction with the erection of the· monu-
ment or the completion of the grounds to the said com-
nlittee; and Taylor·Woolley, a mem:ber of the committee, 
was its architect and was paid substantial sums of money 
for his professional services by the committee; 
That there are no statutes or resolutions adopted 
by the Legislature of the State of Utah designating a 
"Commission" and that" the only reference in the Ses-
sion L.aws of Utah are to a "committee" relating to the 
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construction of the ~"l,his Is The !>lace" InOnlunent; 
That the Utah State Auditor, Ferrell H. Adams, did 
not audit and 'vas not perinitted, by the conunittee, to 
audit the books and records of the committee during the. 
tern1 of office from 1945 to 1949·; 
That the allegations of the First and Second Causes 
of Action in the Complaint as to work done, agreements 
executed, payments made and the reasonable value o~ 
the "extra" services, together with the balance due and 
owing, are true and correct (R. 113-116). 
The defense of the nmnerous defendants, as shown 
by the Motions to Dismiss, appears to be predicated 
upon the basis that a prior action was filed by the plain-
tiff against the said defendants as "A Voluntary Associ-
ation," being Civil No. 1469 in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah. This complete lawsuit is 
set forth in detail at Record 121 to 187. In that matter 
a stipulation of facts was filed with the Federal Court 
(R. 126-127-128), and argument apparently was had on 
the ~{otions to Dismiss the Complaint. An Answer and 
Counter-Claim was filed in that proceeding in response 
to the Second Amended Complaint and thereafter a pre-
trial order was entered F·ebruary 14, 1949 (R. 130) in 
which no issue as to the status of the defendants being 
a state agency was ever raised or mentioned. Later, on 
March 25, 1949, the case was dismissed without any trial 
of the issues and the following l\iinute Entry is the only 
record of what transpired (R. 123) : 
"On this 25th day of March, 1949, plaintiff 
appearing by E. C. Jensen and A. C. Melville, his 
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attorneys, and the defendants appearing by J. 
Lambert Gibson, Assistant Attorney G-eneral of 
the f)tate of Utah and this case coming on for 
' hearing on the plea of the defendants set forth 
in the answer that the court lacks jurisdiction to 
hear and determine the controversy and lacks 
jurisdiction over the defendants and the parties 
hereto having filed a stipulation of facts and the 
court having heard oral arguments of counsel and 
being fully advised in the pre1nises, it is ordered 
that the plaintiff's complaint and defendants' 
counterclaim be, and the san1e are hereby dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction." 
Immediately following the same the Clerk entered 
judgment of dismissal "for lack of jurisdiction" (R. 12.2'). 
No appeal has been taken from the action of the 
Federal District Judge, Tillman D. Johnson, in dismiss-
ing the case for lack of jurisdiction, but instead the par-
ties then moved to the District Court of the State of 
Utah where the present case was filed. 
The following additional facts are pertinent which 
are found in the Session Laws of the State of Utah: 
The 1937 Session of the Legislature (p. 286) adopted 
March 11, 1937 House Joint Resolution No. 14 relating 
to the erection of a memorial on the F·ort Douglas Mili-
tary Reservation commemorating the entrance of the 
Mormon Pioneers of 1847 into the Salt Lake Valley. The 
Legislature recommended to the Governor the appoint-
ment of a committee of citizens of this State to procure 
a suitable design and make tentative plans for a monu-
ment to be so erected. $2500.00 was approp-riated for the 
purposes of the committee. The committee was to report 
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back to the Governor ru1d Legislature after coJ.npleting 
their investigations. 
The next Statutory appearance of the committee is 
in the Laws of Utah, 1939 (p. 184), wherein Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 12 passed on March 9, 19'39, accepts and 
approves the report of the committee which had been 
appointed by the Governor, and then recommended that 
the Governor appoint a committee to raise the additional 
funds necessary for the erection of the monument, other 
than funds appropriated by the State of Utah. In said 
Resolution, the estimated cost of $250,000.00 was set, and 
it was proposed that the Legislature appropTiate one-
half, but the Resolution decided that it was impossible 
th&t year to make the appropTiation. $5·,000.00 was dir-
ected to be appropriated for use by the committee in 
carrying forward the p·reliminary plans for the erection 
of the monument. 
In 1945 Session Laws on page 29·2, we find as part 
of the appropriations bill, I tern No. 135 which reads : 
''To This is the Place Monument Committee from the 
General Fund $125,000.00. This amount to be made avail-
able only when an additional $125,000.00 is deposited by 
the committee.' " 
S.TATEMEN·T O!F POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE ACTION OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE IN 
CIVIL NO. 1469 DISMISSING THAT PROCEEDING FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION, WAS NOT RES JUDICATA SQ 
AS TO PREVENT TI-IE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT 
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LAKE COUNTY FROM HEARING AND DETERMINING 
TI-lE ISSUES IN THIS CASE. 
POINT TWO 
THE "THIS IS THE PLACE MONUMENT COMMIT-
TEE " ALSO KNOWN AS "THIS IS THE PLACE MONU-
' MENT COMMISSION," WAS NOT AN AGENCY OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH BUT A VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION. 
POINT THREE 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
1\iOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY TI-IE 
DEFENDANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE ACTION OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE IN 
CIVIL NO. 1469 DISMISSING THAT. PROCEEDING FOR 
LACK OF_ JURISDICTION, WAS NOT RES JUDICATA SO 
AS TO PREVENT THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY FROM HEARING AND DETERMINING 
THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE. 
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the inter-
pretations thereof, the matter of summary judgment is 
considered in Rule No. 56. The Trial Court is required 
to make an order specifying the facts that appear with-
out substantial controversy (Rule 56 (d)), which said 
facts shall be determined from examining the pleadings 
and the affidavits that are permitted under Rule 56. 
The Court has apparently ignored completely the affida-
vit of the plaint!ff, Daniel Mcc·arthy, as to the status 
of the affairs and the validity of the claim against the 
named defendants as a voluntary association. However, 
the Court has accepted and relied· upon only one phase 
10 
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of the proceeding and that is the issue of res judicata 
and detennined such exclusively froin the affidavit of 
Irwin Cla \\~son, to 'v hich "~as attached the copy of the 
file in the United States District Court case. 
In order for a n1atter to be res judicata under the 
general rules of law, there must be a final determination 
of the issues rendered upon the merits of the case,. This 
rule is outlined in 30 Am. J ur. 908 : 
"Briefly stated, the doctrine of res judicata 
is that an existing final judgment rendered upon 
the 1nerits, without fraud or collusion, by a court 
of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, 
questions, and facts in issue, as to the parties 
and their privies, in all other actions in the same 
or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent juris-
diction. 
"The doctrine of res judicata is a principle 
of universal jurisprudence, forming a part of the 
legal systems of all civilized nations. It is not, 
however, to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the 
ends of justice; there are exceptions to it based 
upon important reasons of policy. There is also 
support for the rule that judgments relied upon 
as creating an estoppel are to be construed with 
strictness." 
As this n1atter arose prior to the adoption of the 1953 
statutes, we would like to cite to the Court Section 104-
30-7, 1Jtah Code Annotated, 1943, which reads as follows: 
··-"-~ final judgment dismissing the complaint, 
either before or after a trial, does not prevent a 
new action for the same cause of action, unless it 
expressly declares, or unless it appears by the 
judg1nent roll, that the judgment is rendered upon 
the merit~." 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Your Court has on a number of occasions affirmed 
the spirit and intent of that statute through judicial 
determination. In the case of Wilcox v. Wwn.de:rlic:h, et 
al, 272 Pac. 207; ______ Utah ______ (p. 212), it was held that 
a judgment of non-suit is not a bar to further proceed-
ings upon the merits. The same rule is stated in Guthiel 
v. Gilmore., 76 Pac. 628; 27 Utah 496; and much more 
recently in the case of Morris v. Russell, 2'36 Pac. (2d) 
451, ______ Utah ______ (p. 455), wherein the Court con-
sidered the question of whether or not a dismissal after 
the plaintiff's evidence was in, operated as a judgment 
to bar the right of recovery itself, and therein the court 
stated: 
"The rules of procedure are not designed for 
that purpose and should not he so interpreted or 
applied as to permit any such mischief. Rule 
41 (b) must be held to apply only when the grant- . 
ing of the rnotion rules that there is no right to 
recover at all; but it does not apply to the facts 
in this case where the disn1issal was as to one 
theory only and not to the right to recovery." 
Another basic rule of law seems to be that where a 
Court is without jurisdiction of a prior action, except 
only such power as is needed to dismiss the same, such 
judgment of dismissal is not res judicata in a subse-
quent proceeding thereon. This rule was adopted with 
the emphasis that a judgment becomes res judicata ordy 
when the Court has acquired jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter and the parties. (Hutton v. Dodge, 198 Pa.c. 
165; 58 Utah 228). This rule has been reaffirmed by our 
sister state of Arizona recently in the case of N ew~holl v. 
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.JfcGill, 212 Pac. ~~d) 764, in W'hieh the rPeord shows 
that the prior Blatter was presented to a Court which 
'Yas 'Yi thout jurisdiction of the cause because of an 
earlier decision of the Arizona Supreme Court (157 Pac. 
(2d) 347), except to disn1iss the case; and, therefore, 
such dismissal is not res judicata. 
Another Utah case is that of 1J1athews v. Malhews, 
13~ Pac. (:2d) 111 ~ 102 Utah 4:28. '11herein the Court 
applied the rule of res judicata to bar the action then 
before the Court upon the grounds that the parties had 
in a prior proceeding before the sa1ne District Court, 
being one of concurrent jurisdiction, received a deter-
nlination in the form of a judgment directly upon the 
points at bar. The Court expressed the general rules 
that the foundation principle upon which the doctrine of 
res judicata rests is that the parties ought not to be per-
rnitted to litigate the same issue more than once and 
that when a right or a fact has been judicially tried and 
deterr.ained by a court of competent jurisdiction, public 
policy requires that there should be an end to litigation 
and that the same issues should not be re-tried. That, of 
course, is a sound statement of the general principles 
but does not appear to apply to the case now at hand, as 
this plaintiff, Daniel McCarthy, has been deprived of 
the opportunity to litigate the issues and there has been 
no determination upon the merits of such issues. One 
may search in vain the entire files of the United States 
District Court in the prior case to locate any findings 
of fact or determination factually of the issues between 
the parties. 
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Attention is drawn to the fact that no question was 
presented or raised in the United States Court pre-trial 
order as to the rna tter of dismissal of the case and that 
when the argument and order of dismissal was finally_ 
made, such was "for hearing on the plea of the defend-
ants set forth in the Answer that the Court lacks juris-
diction to hear and determine the controversy and lacks 
jurisdiction over the defendants" (R. 123). The said 
plea of "lack of jurisdiction" is set forth in the Answer 
and Counterclaim of the defendants in that case before 
' the United States District Court and particularly para-
graphs II and III of the "First Cause of Action," (R. 
134-135), which reaJd: 
"II. F'or answer to Paragraph II of Plain-
tiff's First Cause of Action Defendants deny that 
the action is between citizens and residents of 
different states; Defendants admit that the 
amount involved in said action exceeds the sum 
of Three Thousand ($3,000.00) D·ollars exclusive 
of interest and costs; and Defendants deny each 
and every allegation contained in said Paragraph 
II not herein expressly admitted. 
"III. For answer to Pragraph III of plain-
. tiff's First Cause of Action Defendants admit the 
allegations contained therein except that the 
defendants allege said agreement was entered 
into by the Defendant ''This is the Place" Monu-
ment Co1nmission and the Plaintiff, and Defend-
ants deny that said Defendant or any of the 
Defendants are an "association," but affin11a-
tively allege that said "This is the Place" Monu-
ment Commission is an agency of the State of 
Utah." 
14 
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l\Iay one examine the file and say that Judge Johnson 
determined that the defendants "vere an agency of the 
State of Utah and that such was the basis of his ruling_ 
that his Court lacked jurisdiction, or that he determined 
that this was not an action between citizens and residents 
of different states as claimed by the defendants in p·ara-
graph II of their Answer. It is a matter of pure specu-
lation to fathom the reasoning of the United States 
District Court Judge and cannot be demonstrated on the 
record. The State District Court should not probe into 
the reasoning or the theories of the Federal District 
Judge but must determine the doctrine of res judicata 
upon the record before it without speculating on the 
Federal Court's unexpressed thoughts. 
In 1940 this Court decided Gibson v. Uta~h State 
Teachers' R·etirement Board, 105 Pac. (2d) 353; 99 Utah 
576, and held at page 355·: 
''The record reveals that the· District Court 
did not make any finding or determination, or 
enter any judgment with respect to the status of 
rights of Plaintiff under the Teachers' Retire-
ment Act. The action was dismissed, presurna.bly 
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since that 
was the only issue raised or heard there. Such 
action was, and is, not res adjudicata." 
The defendants have taken refuge on the question 
of res judicata in some very early decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court and particularly in the following 
cases: 
Cromwell v. Sac. County, 94 U. S. 351 (24 :195). 
Mason Lumber Co. v. Buchtel, 101 U. S. 638 
(2'5 :1074). 
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Stout v. Lye, 103 U.S. 66 (26 :428). 
Nesbitt v. Riverside Independent Dist., 144 U. S. 
610 ( 36 :5·62). 
Jolvnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U. s .. 252 (38:429). 
Last Chalnc~e Min. Co. v. TyZ.er Min. Co., 157 U.S. 
683 ( 39 :859). 
Fo·rsyth v. Hammond, 41 L. Ed .. 1100; 166 U. S. 
506; 41 L. Ed. 109·5 at 1100. 
Southern P. R. Co. v. U'YIIited States, 168 U. S. 48, 
49, 42 L. Ed. 376, 377, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18. 
In the Forsyth v. Hammond case we find the follow-
ing set of facts which wholly differentiate it from our 
present case. Proceedings were· filed in 1893 in the 
Indiana District Court to prevent annexation of a large 
tract of land to the City of Hammond. Trial was had and 
upon verdict of the jury, the Court entered a decree in 
favor of the City for annexation of the area. The·present 
plaintiff was a party to such action as an owner of 725 
acres within the area annexed and took an appeal to the 
Indiana Supreme Court which affirmed the annexation 
decree. Thereafter, the city levied taxes on her property 
and by this action she seeks an injunction to restrain 
collection of those taxes. Motion for injunction was 
denied and the action dismissed on demurrer. She 
appealed to the U. S. Circuit Court where the order was 
reversed and the case remanded for trial. The City of 
Hammond then applied to the United States Supren1e 
Court for certiorari which was ordered. 
One issue raised was that of res judicata as the same 
Issues were presented as had been heard by the state 
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court. lleld: the decree by the Indiana courts \vas res 
judicata: ··~Chough the form and causes of action be dif-
ferent, a decision by a court of co1npetent jurisdiction 
action is conclusive between the parties in all subsequent 
in respect to any essential fact or question in the one 
actions." Then the Court further considered and decided 
that the ·'matter in controversy is one peculiarly within 
the do1nain of state control. Kelly v. Pittsburg, 104 U. S. 
78." For these and other reasons stated in the opinion, 
the Circuit Court was reversed and the case remanded to 
the lT. S. District Court for dismissal. 
POINT TWO 
THE "THIS IS THE PLACE MONUMENT COMMIT-
TEE," ALSO KNO~VN AS "THIS IS THE PLACE MO·NU-
MENT COiviMISSION," WAS NOT AN AGENCY OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH BUT A VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION. 
In conformance with the permissive provisions of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff has alleged 
two separate theories in two separate causes of action. 
The second cause is predicated on the theory that the 
defendants are in truth and fact merely a voluntary 
association of individuals engaged in the erection of the 
pioneer monument. This contention is not controverted 
by any Answer by any defendant and finds ample sup-
port in the Affidavit of the plaintiff, Daniel McCarthy 
(R. 113-116). 
The defense that an organization is a state .agency 
and hence immune from suit unless its consent has been 
given, is to be strictly construed. There should be no 
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doubt left in the Court's n1ind that it is a state agency or 
it should be required to face litigation and have the 
rights adjudicated. 
These defendants have not pointed to any valid 
statutory creation of their purported "Commission." 
As shown by Mr. McCarthy's Affidavit and the session 
laws of 1937, 1939 and 1945, appropriating money to a 
"Committee" referred to earlier in this brief, the bulk 
of the funds involved in the defendant's activities came 
from private sources and the erection of the monument 
in question was not handled as required by the statutes 
of a state agency (Title 10, l~. C. 1~. 1943). 1\fonies were 
spent as, when and in such amounts as pleased the mem-
bers; the funds were in a private bank account, the monu-
ment was not erected on state lands and apparently does 
not belong to the State of Utah, no oaths of office were 
filed by any member of the committee, and there is no 
statute creating the "Commission." 
We do not question the civic intentions of the mem-
bership of this committee. But plaintiff has contracted 
in good faith, has erected the granite for this imposing 
monument and performed valuable services at their 
behest and now should be permitted to present evidence_ 
in support of his claim for $42,145.60 plus interest. Only 
if this defendant committee is a valid state agency can 
they evade their responsibility to their contractor. 
It would seem rather axiomatic that a public office 
or state agency does not merely exist, it must be created 
by law. The only statutory mention of this committee 
1s found in the Joint Resolution in 1937 appropriating 
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$2500.00 to the •'Cominittee" for tentative monun1ent 
plans, a Joint Resolution in 1939 when $5000.00 was 
appropriated for use by the "Committee," in 1943 when 
$15,000.00 was appropriated and in 1945 when there was 
appropriated ••To This is the Place Monument Commit-
tee from the General Fund $125,000.00. This amount to 
be made available only when an additional $125,000.00 
is deposited by the Committee." 
A general statement of the rules relating to the 
creation and existence of public offices is found at 42 
An1. J ur. 902-903: 
"An office is generally created by some con-
stitutional or statutory provision, or by some 
tribunal or body to which the power to create the· 
office has been delegated, although it is not neces-
sary that the legislature or other creating body 
declare in express words that the office is created; 
the use of any language which shows the legis-
lative intent is sufficient. The mere appropria-
tion by the legislature or general assembly of 
money for the payment of compensation to the 
incumbent of a specified position does not have 
the effect of creating an office. In deterrnining 
whether or not a public office is created, it is 
important to keep in n1ind that such an office 
i1nplies duties and the discharge of such duties, 
that is, an agency from the sovereign power to 
perform them, so that the duties of the office are 
of the first consequence, and the agency from the 
state to perform them the next step in the creation 
of an office. Where offices are created, the 
appointing body cannot by mere appointment of 
incumbents expand or reduce the number of" such 
offices at its discretion. It may here he noted 
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that an 'office' is a legal entity, and rnay exist 
in fact, although it is without any incurnbent." 
rr,he issues here raised were apparently taken for 
granted by the Court and all partie·s in the T'ho11WtS v. 
Da.ughters of Utah Pioneers, 197 Pac. (2d) 477, 114 Utah 
108. The legislature started its appropriations in 1925 
to the Daughters and later authorized a 99 year lease of 
the "triangle" to thern. In 19·43 the Legislature appro-
priated to "'the Utah State Building Board" $225,000.00 
to be used towards construction of a mernorial building 
to be used only when the Daughters had deposited $75,-
000.00 with the State Treasurer. No one contended that' 
the Daughters were or are an agency of the State of 
Utah. The ''public purpose" of the memorial building, 
even as this monument, will be conceded. In the 
Daughters case the land belonged to the state and the 
co1npleted building and land were leased to the Daughters 
for a fixed term. 
Our monument \vas erected on federal land - a part 
of Ft. D·ouglas, largely by private subscription, through 
a group of individuals appointed by the Governor and 
organized as a "committee." Their adoption of a trade 
name of "·This Is The Place Monument Commission" did 
not constitute them an arm or agency of the State of 
Utah. There is no statute creating this "Commission"; 
no enacting clause as required by our p-rocedure; no 
supervision over construction by the Building Board; no 
supervision over the expenditure of funds; no auditing 
by the Auditor; and many other negative signs. verify 
the complete absence of any state agency. 
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A 1natter soine,vhat akin "ras considered in Sta,te v. 
Bonnett, :201 Pac. (2d) 939, 11-l: Utah 5±6, wherein an 
option to purchase land signed by the Utah State Hospi-
tal \\Tas specifically enforced. One defense raised was 
that the Hospital, through ad1nittedly an arm of the 
state ( 85-7-1, U. C. A. 1943), was not a lega'l entity. The 
suit for specific performance was brought by the state 
by and through its Public Welfare Co1nmission. The 
court detern1ined that the option bound only the vendors 
until and when the approval of the Governor and the 
Department of Finance had been obtained. It was 
further found that the Hospital and its superintendent 
\Vere in fact authorized to and acting for the State of 
Utah and the Public Welfare Commission. 
In our n1onun1ent case no such facts exist. The con-
struction contract at no point bears the name of the 
State of Utah nor of any statutory agency, officer, or 
branch of the state. Is there any contention that these 
defendants were employees of the Finance Comn1ission, 
the Department of Engineering, the Building Commis-
sion, the Historical Society, or any other state agency~ 
The answer is, no! 
The Legis'lature vested in our Utah state building 
board the authority and sole power .to carry out the 
the building and expansion program of the state as and 
when funds are available-and particularly all such when 
the estimated cost is in excess of $3000.00. As shown 
by the stipulation on file in the F·ederal cas·e attached 
to Mr. Irwin Cla-\vson's Affidavit and by the separate 
Affidavit of Mr. McCarthy, the building board was not 
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eonsulted nor did it in any manner handle the bids or 
other steps relating to this monument. Section 10-0~7 
(9) Utah Code Annotated, 1943 authorizes the building 
board to be sued "only upon written contracts made by 
it or under its authority and sealed with its official seal." 
Had this n1onument been a state project, of neces-
sity the sa1ne would have been under the supervision of 
and contract with the· building board. Then they could 
sue the contractor and the contractor would have an 
action against the state for monies due and owing. The 
state board has not adopted or ratified the action of this 
defendant committee. No indicia of state agency is 
shown of record beyond the appropriation of money to 
be used along with greater private funds to erect the 
pioneer 1nonument. The 1~37 Resolution and the 1939 
Resolutions authorized the Governor to appoint a com-
nlittee of citizens to make plans and to raise funds for 
erection of the monument. 
Vv e find no statute creating the defendant "Comn1is-
sion" and no statutory definition of the terms, powers, 
duties or privileges of the members thereof. Can the 
individuals, after doing as they pleased in the erection 
of the monument, now hide behind the skirts of state 
immunityf See 81 C.J.S. 978: 
"Exercise of powers in generaL Powers 
granted to state administrative agencies must be 
exercised in a just and reasonable manner, and 
in conformity with the statutory or constitutional 
source of the power conferred. A board or com-
mission on which the legislature confers broad 
general powers is invested .with discretion in 
choosing means and methods. of accompiishing the 
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result expected, and, in the absence of fraud or 
1nanifest abuse of that discretion, its determina-
tion is conclusive. State officers whose duties 
are fixed and functions linrited by statute may 
not waive the terms of a statute affecting the 
substantive rights of the state. 
"'In the absence of statute to the contrary, the 
action of a majority of a state administrative 
body is controlling. State officers lack power to 
authorize a violation of the law." 
We submit that there is absolutely no substantial 
evidence of the creation of a state agency and in law the 
defendants did not constitute an arm, agency, depart-
nlent or branch of the State of Utah. Even if such could 
be construed, yet plaintiff's second cause of action should 
be permitted to stand as they have ignored and violated 
the. requirements of the statutes relating to the construc-
tion 0~ public buildings, letting of contracts, etc. (10-0-
7, and 10-0-9, lT. C. A. 1943). 
Under such circumstances the individuals themselves 
may be held to account and be sued under the theory of 
State v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 78 Pac. 
(2d) 502, 94 Utah 502. There the contractor and the 
1nembers of the Road Commission were held to be p-roper 
parties defendant where the members of the Road Com-
Inission had taken private lands without following the 
statutory condemnation procedure. 
POINT ·THREE 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
Under Rule 8 (e) (2) plaintiff was entitled to state 
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two or more clailns regardless of consistency and whether 
based upon legal or on equitable grounds or both. Rule 
8 (f) reads, "All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice." 
We seek now the right to have the court hear and 
determine the balance due and owing to this plaintiff for 
materials and labor perforrned in the erection of the 
pioneer monument. To conform with the spirit of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure that those rules will be liberally 
construed to secure just, speedy and inexpensive deter-
Inina tion of this action, we urge that the matter be 
allowed to go to trial on the facts. 
The defendants' motions to dismiss and for sum-
mary judgment should be strictly construed as an 
atte1npt to revert back to the old pleadings practices of 
technicalities. Rule 56 contains the provisions as to Sum-
mary Judgment which, like the motions to dismiss or for 
judgn1ent on the pleadings, limits the Court to the plead-
ings and affidavits before him. The Court must give 
full effect to the affidavits of both parties. 
The most recent declaration of this matter that we 
have found is -in Young v. Felorrvia, 244 Pac. ('2d) 862, 
______ Utah ______ , wherein the court cited Rule 56 (c) (U. R. 
C. P.), and stated, "Under this rule, it is clear that if 
there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, the 
motion should be denied." We are in agreement with 
this rule and assert that a review of the affidavits and 
pleadings shows that there are a number of substantial, 
genuine issues as to material facts. 
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C.ONC·LUSION 
''T e respectfully subn1it that the District Court erred 
in granting the defendants' motions for summary judg-
ment as to plaintiff's second cause of action, and this 
case should be sent back to the District Court for trial 
of the issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUIGSLEY, HAYES· & RAMPT·ON, 
By HARRY D. PUGSLEY, 
Atto~neys for DOJWiel McCart:hy, 
A p·p~ellam.t. 
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